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Abstract
This article argues that since 1994, but especially since 1996, the IFP has progressively
moved away from the Zulu nationalist rhetoric and confrontational tactics of the
transition period which we term the 'militant Zulu nationalist' strategy. The reasons for
this are not to be found in changed political objectives, for instance the IFP remains
committed to provincial autonomy, but rather in changed political and institutional
conditions. First, with the completion of the KwaZulu-Natal constitution-making
processin 1996, the issues of the transition which divided the IFP from the ANC, namely
the form of state and process towards it, have been settled. Second, new political
developments such as the 'defection' of the Zulu King, and new institutional conditions
such as a stake in democracy and the return of law and order, have made the strategy of
'militant Zulu nationalism' redundant, even counter-productive. To some extent this has
been replaced by a conservative-liberal ideology and more co-operative tactics, but it
has also heightened internal divisions and exposed a sense of directionlessness
symptomatic of an identity crisis.
Introduction
The recent rumours of a merger between the African National Congress (ANC) and the
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) have tended to point to the similarities in policy between the
two parties. A less frequently noted point is the extent to which the ideological and
tactical gulf between these erstwhile rivals has narrowed since the 1994 election. To
some extent this is due to the moderation of ANC positions, but it also reflects a sea-
change in IFP politics over the last three years, and it is this shift which this paper
addresses. It is argued that while the IFP remains by-and-large committed to securing
more autonomy for KwaZulu-Natal, it lias moved away from the Zulu nationalist
rhetoric and confrontational tactics of the transition period which we term the 'militant
Zulu nationalist' strategy. To some extent this has been replaced by a conservative-liberal
ideology and more co-operative tactics, but it lias also heightened internal divisions and
exposed a sense of directionlessness symptomatic of an identity crisis. In brief then, the
politics of the IFP lias changed to an extent which lias called into question the very
reasons for its existence.
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The clue to understanding why this shift in strategy, rather than objective, has had such
a profound impact lies in understanding the centrality of transition politics to the IFP's
identity. We would suggest that it was differences in the preferred form of post-apartheid
state, but especially the impact of different parties on this, with all its attendant status
implications, which defined the power-struggle between the IFP and ANC. Hence our
focus on the provincial constitution-making process after 1994 as the medium through
which the IFP made its final attempt to influence the form of, and process to, a post-
apartheid state. As our examination illustrates, while the IFP's approach to the provincial
constitution largely reproduced the militant Zulu nationalist strategy of the transition
years (at the same time as such an approach was on the wane in other areas of its political
practice), it was a strategy that failed. Charmed and compelled into the new political
order, the IFP found itself playing by a set of rules which rendered old strategies
redundant, even counter-productive. However, not only was the final battle over
provincial autonomy a hard lesson in liberal-democratic politics but, through eroding
key differences between the IFP and ANC, the spur to an identity crisis. The decline of
'militant Zulu nationalism' could therefore, possibly signal the beginning of the end for
the IFP.
Our argument begins by outlining the IFP's strategy of the transition period. This is
followed by an analysis of how the provincial constitution-making process in KwaZulu-
Natal proved the crucial lesson in the new strategic imperatives of liberal-democratic
politics. Last is an account of the IFP's gradual retreat from militant Zulu nationalism in
other domains of political practice, and die identity crisis this has prompted.
The IFP's Transition Politics
Crudely put, the IFP's politics of the transition1 was an extension of its practice during die
1980s. Widi die advent of militant protest politics, especially following die launch of die
ANC-aligned United Democratic Front (UDF) in 1984, Inkatiia found its leadership of
internal anti-apartheid resistance openly challenged. From a position where, at its 1975
launch, it was regarded as the internal wing of die ANC, leadership differences witii die
ANC grew to die point of open rivalry. Aided and abetted by die state, tiiis rivalry rapidly
degenerated into violent conflict. Consequently, in die battle to retain at least provincial
control (due to its monopoly of die KwaZulu Bantustan), Inkatha adopted a more explicit
advocacy of Zulu interests (Forsytii, 1989:153; Mare", 1992:68-70; Davidson and Strand,
1993:55; Campbell et al, 1995:295) and a more confrontational approach to its political
rivals, if not the state (see Aitchison, 1988; Kentridge, 1990:25-6; Maake, 1992:593-7;
Aitchison, 1993; Taylor and Shaw, 1994:38). Importantiy, die reversion to militant Zulu
nationalism should be understood as a reflection of the IFP's political weakness.
Outcompeted by ANC-aligned rivals for national leadership of die black (ratiier tiian just
Zulu) anti-apartheid movement, the IFP was forced to turn to its Bantustan base and the
key constituencies of traditional leaders, KwaZulu civil servants and businessmen
(Piper, 1996:3). Indeed, we would suggest tiiat die more intense the political competition
between Inkatiia and its rivals, die more it withdrew into its KwaZulu base and embraced
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ethnic rhetoric and confrontatioa
This relationship between, on the one hand, the strategic couplet of Zulu discourse and
confrontational tactics and, on the other, the declining fortunes of the IFP, continued in
the 1990s. However, there were important differences. For one thing, the invocation of
Zuluness and militant confrontation became more intense as its fortunes declined,
climaxing just before the 1994 elections in the IFP's only moment of pure Zulu
nationalism - quasi-military mass support for King Zwelithini's call for an autonomous
Zulu kingdom (Piper and Piper, 1995:4-6). In response, the ANC did an about turn on its
anti-ethnicity position of the 1980s, embracing Zuluness as a political resource,
especially in KwaZulu-Natal (interviews with Carrim, 11-8-96; Lubisi, 13-4-96,15-7-
96, 4-9-96; Nzimande, 18-7-96 and 24-7-96). Indeed this particular sensitivity
reinforced the ANC's burgeoning discourse of 'rainbow nationalism' reflected in its
'many cultures, one nation' slogan (see, for example, Mathieson and Attwell, 1995:12).
In sum then, negotiations saw the Zulu moment to Inkatha's politics of the 1980s both
deepened and broadened into the politics of Zuluness of the 1990s.
Why was this the case? Quite simply, negotiations promised to achieve the ultimate
goal of all South African resistance movements - the end of apartheid - with high
dividends for those able to dominate this process. These stakes pushed political parties
into an intense struggle to impose their vision of both the content of, and process to, a
post-apartheid state. It was a struggle with divergent results. For those parties like the
ANC and NP which enjoyed significant influence, negotiations came to be seen as a
positive-sum game where compromise outweighed conflict Hence the moderation of
ANC and NP positions over time. For those parties which did not enjoy much influence,
like the IFP, negotiations remained a zero-sum competition (Tonkin, 1996: ii). Thus
marginalised, the IFP resorted to Zulimess and confrontation. In the context of
negotiations the latter took the form of brinkmanship - upping the costs of its exclusion as
an equal partner in the bargaining process to try and force accommodation as an equal.
Ironically then, the IFP's invocation of militant Zulu nationalism was more a cry for
inclusion in the South African polity than a genuine call for a sovereign Zulu state.
This trend was evident from virtually the beginning of the negotiations process.
Frustrated by the rejection of its strongly federal vision3 and at its lack of recognition as
one of the 'big three' political parties in negotiations/ the IFP resorted to a familiar
gambit of tactics: hyperbolic and ethno-nationalist rhetoric, ultimatums, walkouts and
boycotts of negotiations, legal challenges, public protests and, allegedly, collusion in the
escalating violence. Importantly, these tactics did not always enjoy unanimous support
from all IFP leadership, but they nevertheless dominated the party's approach. Indeed,
these same tactics and confrontational mindset seemed to characterise the IFP's
behaviour after 1994. However, by early 1996 the party had largely moved some way
from its militant Zulu nationalist strategy. Tins shift was most evident in the contrast
between the IFP's campaigning for the 1994 national elections and the 1996 local
government elections. Where, in the former, it presented itself as the virulent advocate of
Zulu nationalism, in the latter it had apparently metamorphosized into a conservative-
liberal opposition party for whom Zuluness was incidental (see Randall, 1996; Piper,
1997: chapter 8). In short, it appeared as if the IFP was adjusting to the new order and
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increasingly engaging in terms conducive to liberal-democracy. This was not an even or
linear process however, indeed, as the following section reveals, it was in the domain of
provincial constitution-making that militant Zulu nationalism enjoyed its longest, if
somewhat patchy, tenure.
KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Constitution-Making
As suggested, the IFP approached the provincial constitution-making process in
KwaZulu-Natal in the same manner as it had the national versioa The refusal of the ANC
to entertain international mediation, and the EFP's rejection of the Constitutional
Assembly (CA), meant that the party saw the provincial constitution-making process as a
more favourable medium to continue the battle over the national constitution.4 Further, it
continued to regard negotiations in zero-sum terms, not least because of a perception
amongst certain leadership figures, if not all, that the ANC was negotiating in bad faith,
intending to filibuster and so prevent agreement. Consequently, one might expect that,
when confronted by opposition, the IFP would resort to the established couplet of Zulu
nationalism and confrontation (in the case of constitutional issues the latter took the form
of brinkmanship).
To some extent this is what happened, although from the outset there was clearly a
greater ambiguity in the party about the reversion to militant Zulu nationalism, reflected
in evermore public divides between party leadership. In part this was a reluctance rooted
in doubts about the effectiveness of old tactics, but it also reflected a growing concern
amongst more moderate elements about the advisability of such strategies in the new
political terrain. As Arthur Konigkramer put it, 'we were no longer opposing a party, the
ANC, but the state' (personal communication, 1998). Indeed, we would suggest that the
reconfiguration of party power-bases and constituencies under the new liberal-
democratic order, along with the associated political culture, made the militant
nationalist strategy inadvisable, even counter-productive. This seems confirmed by the
fact that the IFP was already beginning to move away from such strategies in domains of
political practice outside the constitution-making one. However, despite these
developments, militant Zulu nationalism was employed for one last, if ill-fated, time.
National Constitution-Making after 1994
For several months after the 1994 elections political parties basked in the afterglow of a
celebrated plebiscite. At its annual conference in July 1994, the IFP spoke in confident
terms of expanding its constituency to intellectuals, the youth and other ethnic and racial
groups. This positive approach continued at the August opening of the CA which was
intended to polish the interim constitution into a final 'birth certificate of the nation'
{Constitutional Assembly Annual Report 1996), This document had then to be ratified by
the Constitutional Court as consistent with the provisions of the interim constitution.
According to the IFP's Walter Felgate:
IFP POLITICS 85
the struggle for the domination of true federalism over unitarianism or
some or other form of regionalism will now take place in an arena in
which for any party the only unlevelled ground on the playing field
will be ground that it chums up by its inability to make its own mark.
The constitution-making in this House will be a far cry from what it
was inKemptonPark.'
By mid-1995 the EFP's optimism had begun to wane. Frustrated by the ANC's
dominance of the CA, the IFP insisted that international mediation be resumed before
negotiations proceed, arguing that this much was implicit in the 19 April 1994 agreement
(IFP Submission to CA, 1995). In this respect they enjoyed the support of peace-broker
Washington Okumu who said he had expected mediation to happen soon after the 1994
election {Weekly Mail & Guardian 24-2-95).The ANC, however, proved extremely
reluctant to honour international mediation arguing that the terms of reference needed to
be clarified - a position shared by the NP. The ANC also accused the IFP of avoiding
democratic forums and pointed out that King Zwelitliini, whose constitutional status was
an item for discussion, had rejected the call for international mediation (The Natal
Witness 6-3-95). The IFP responded that the terms of reference were clear, and that King
Zvvelithini's opinion did not matter as he was not a signatory, but a summit meeting
betweenMandela, de Klerk and Buthelezi in early 1995 failed to find a solution. At about
the same time Frank Mdlalose, KwaZulu-Natal premier, complained that provincial
governments were not adequately represented in the CA, and the IFP expressed anger at
the way the ANC was using the Government of National Unity (GNU) as a 'rubber
stamp' (Constitutional Talk, 6; WeeklyA faiI & Guardian 15-12-94).
On the 21 February the IFP walked out of the national parliament. According to IFP
Senator Ruth Rabinowitz it was as 'alast resort to notbeing taken seriously as apartner in
the GNU, parliament or Constitutional Assembly' {Weekly Mail & Guardian 3-3-95).
Significantly, this move was tempered by the evident reluctance of many IFP leaders to
be stereotyped as spoilers, as well as a concern over the effectiveness of repeating old
tactics (interview with Felgate, 4-2-97). This is also suggested by the fact that it took the
IFP more than six months to demand that international mediation replace the CA process.
The ANC accused the IFP of trying to distract attention from revelations about its
involvement in violence emanating from the De Kock and other trials, saying that it was
not serious about international mediation otherwise itwould nothave 'rushed' the House
of Traditional Leaders Bill though the KwaZulu-Natal Legislature and appointed
Buthelezi as Chairman {WeeklyMail & Guardian 23-2-95).
Having walked out of parliament, the IFP faced a scenario where, according to
parliamentary rules, MPs would lose their seats if they vacated them for fifteen
consecutive days. At a speedily arranged Special Conference on 5 and 6 March 1995, the
EFP considered various options, including pulling out of the GNU and parliament
altogether and looking to consolidate provincial power - the hard line position advocated
by Youth Brigaders. Eventually the IFP agreed to return to the GNU and parliament but
boycott the CA if its demand for international mediation was not acceded to by 5 April. In
the event, the IFP did eventually leave the CA, but a week after the deadline. Indeed,
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when confronted by SABC television reporters as to why his party had not yet left,
Buthelezi castigated the reporters for not understanding the 'African' conception of
time! A more plausible explanation was that Buthelezi was reluctant to burn his bridges
with the ANC while there still seemed hope they might concede. This view is reinforced
by the 'accommodatory' comments by IFP Constitutional Spokesman Sipho Mzimela
who stated that progress with the ANC was possible, but that Roelf Meyer was the
stumbling block {Weekly Mail & Guardian 31-3-95). In brief then, while the IFP did
return to militant Zulu nationalism (for instance some 20,000 IFP supporters held an
Anti-Freedom Day march in Durban on 1 May), it was a move somewhat reluctantly
made.
Perhaps the reason was, as Walter Felgate put it, that 'the ANC had already digested
[walkouts] as a tactic' (personal interview, 4-2-97). Certainly this move had little impact
on the CA. As Cyril Ramaphosa remarked, 'when [the IFP] walked out we agreed to stick
to the original time frame ... this is a train which will not stop for it' (Mayibuye 6 [6]).
With the IFP out, the ANC's dominance of the CA made the finalisau'on of the
constitution something of a procession. Indeed, according to the AWB, 'the NP put up a
fight with the ANC which can only be compared to cats giving the impression of
"fighting" whilst they are actually copulating' {WeeklyMail & Guardian 10-5-96). This
one-way traffic was undone a little bit in early 1996 when the NP began to offer resistance
on several outstanding clauses, but this was overcome by the ANC's threat of a national
referendum should minority parties fail to concur. In the event, the most significant
challenge to the CA came from the provincial constitution-writing process in KwaZulu-
Natal.
Provincial Constitution-Making in KwaZuIu-Natal
Having tinned its back on the Constitutional Assembly, the IFP looked to challenge the
ANC's constitutional hegemony through the drafting of the KwaZulu-Natal constitution
The EFP's tactic moved from the premise that the national and provincial constitution-
making processes were of equal standing politically, if not legally (interview with Smith,
23-7-96). According to Walter Felgate, 'die more we claim our rights now, the more
difficult it will be for the national constitution to take away our powers' (Weekly Mail &
Guardian 20-10-95).That he had a point was reflected in the ANC's instruction to the
provinces it controlled to wait until after the national constitution was completed before
drawing up their constitutions. Consequently, the early ratification by the Constitutional
Court of a KwaZulu-Natal constitution which asserted significant powers would force
'further politics' from the ANC, perhaps even international mediation. As IFP
constitutional adviser Mario Ambrosini put it, 'although there is no obligation for the
Constitutional Assembly to accommodate the provincial constitution, they will have to
declare it unconstitutional to challenge it. That will mean going against a whole region
and will result hi crisis. More likely is that they'll say "let's talk" and we'll have an
opportunity for international mediation' (personal interview, 25-11-95). Further, as the
IFP was the majority parry in the KwaZulu-Natal legislature, it believed it was well
placed to implement its version of the provincial constitution. The race, as it were, was
on.
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The EFP nevertheless remained ambivalent over how to pursue its objectives.
Confronted with the realities of multi-party decision making in the KwaZulu-Natal
legislature, the IFP seemed torn between the need to build consensus in order to secure
the two-thirds majority required for the provincial constitution, and a more
confrontational attempt to rail-road its vision through. This equivocation was reflected,
at least in part, by the comparative influence of provincial and national leadership
respectively. Where provincial EFP leaders began the constitution-making process in
accommodatory style, national EFP leadership soon took over the process, generally
pursuing a more confrontational approach. Importantly, even they periodically returned
to accommodation in the attempt to secure a two-thirds majority timeously. This
ambivalence was also reflected in the way the IFP vacillated between trying to secure a
deal which included the provincial ANC, or simply ignoring it and relying on the support
of all the remaining minority parties. In sum then, even when brinkmanship was the
preferred choice of key EFP leadership, the requirements of liberal-democratic politics
quickly exposed its limitations.
Given its pre-occupation with the CA, it was only really in February 1995 that the EFP
turned to the province. Under the leadership of the moderate provincial IFP leader Arthur
Konigkramer, the KwaZulu-Natal constitutional committee spent six months in multi-
party discussion which, in August 1995, yielded the 'Working Document of
Constitutional Principles' or 'Fernhill Agreement'. Significantly, in an attempt to make
die process an inclusive one, Konigkramer gave minority parties on the committee (The
Minority Front, Democratic Party, Pan-African Congress and African Christian
Democratic Party) representation greater than their popular support warranted. Partly
this reflected the EFP's stated approach to negotiations (interview with Konigkramer, 8-
7-94), but it also meant that if these minorities could be brought on board, die EFP could
secure a two-thirds majority without the ANC - a fact which spurred ANC participatioa
The upshot of this co-operative approach was that the Fernhill Agreement was a
compromise document which affirmed significant provincial powers while avoiding the
bolder assertions of the EFP's previous proposals. The Zulu King was recognised as the
constitutional monarch of the whole of KwaZulu-Natal; the name of the province as the
Kingdom of KwaZulu-Natal was accepted for discussion; and various 'sunrise clauses'
(these are clauses which only take effect when enabled by subsequent national
legislation) were put in a schedule as part of the constitutioa At the same time however,
the EFP recognised that exclusive powers could not be the right of the province alone, and
would have to be shared with national government (KZN Briefing, 1996 [1]). In brief
then, the Fernhill document reflected a positive-sum approach to negotiations which
assumed a degree of good faith amongst the parties involved.
However, neither this agreement nor the assumption of good faith sat well with certain
powerfiil EFP leaders. For Sipho Mzimela, WalterFelgate andadviserMario Ambrosini,
the EFP's national constitutional negotiations team, the Fernhill document was not
assertive enough, and if it was not assertive then it was less likely to achieve the kind of
constitutional crisis it was intended to. This concern was underwritten by the belief that
accommodation with the ANC was pointless as it was committed to forestalling any
provincial constitution (interview withFelgate, 4^2-97). Consequently, discontentbegan
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to surface in mid-1995 when, under the influence of hardliners, the IFP drew up a '20-
point plan' which asserted provincial powers similar to the IFP's various constitutional
proposals since 1990 (Weekly Mail & Guardian 2-6-95). These included provincial
control over KwaZulu-Natal's trade and commerce, education system, media and
security forces. Sensing an imminent backlash, moderates in the IFP leaked the
document in June 1995, prompting the ANC to denounce the proposal as a 'plan for
secession'. While the IFP defended its plan as a proposal to 'speedup the process towards
federalism', Buthelezi's public condemnation of 'white racist' IFP members 'vilifying
him through media leaks' (Financial Mail 2-6-94) reflected real divisions within the IFP
over appropriate constitution-making strategies.
In the event, party hardliners gained the upper hand in August 1995, mobilising the
IFP's National Council to replace Arthur Konigkramer with the more pliable Mike Tan-
as chair of the constitutional committee (interview with Konigkramer, 22-1-97). The
provincial constitution-making process was now driven by Felgate and Ambrosini who,
motivated by the objective to secure as federal a constitution as possible, took a more
confrontational approach. The Fernhill agreement was thrown out and replaced by 'The
Twelve-Point Plan'. This contained a series of sunrise clauses intended to 'express the
aspirations of this province to achieve a substantially greater degree of autonomy and
self-rule within the parameters of a united South Africa once the national constitution so
allows' (The Natal Witness 17-8-95). Correspondingly, the IFP chose to take the process
outside the provincial constitutional committee, and insisted that the Twelve Point Plan
be put to the vote in the provincial assembly. When the two-thirds required agreement
was not forthcoming, the party threatened to call a provincial election if a draft was not
concludedby the end of Augast(FinancialMail 25-8-95).
It was also at tins time that Chief Buthelezi called an imbizo, a gathering of the Zulu
nation, at King's Park. Before a crowd of 40,000 Buthelezi read out a 'covenant'
pledging all Zulus to the battle for an autonomous provincial kingdom wherein their
'freedom and prosperity' would be realised. He also announced that the amakhosi had
resolved to call an early election if, by 1 September, an adequate constitution protecting
the 'freedom and autonomy' of the Zulu kingdom had not been secured. Shortly after this
the ANC accused the IFP of fostering violence on the KwaZulu-Natal South Coast in an
attempt to add pressure to have the provincial constitution passed. In short, IFP strategy
seemed to have returned to the militant Zulu nationalism of the transition: brinkmanship
in negotiations was again married to confrontational tactics and Zulu nationalist
ideology at the mass level. Importantly however, the link between brinkmanship in
negotiations and militant Zulu nationalist tactics at a mass level was only briefly
maintained. For reasons outlined below, militant Zulu nationalism was simply not
sustainable in other domains of politics outside of negotiations, and thus there was no
follow up to the imbizo and nothing was heard of the election threat again.
If, in contrast to the transition period from 1990 to 1994, the IFP's constitutional
power-plays were limited to parliamentary committees and processes, it was an approach
that remained doggedly confrontational. In the provincial constitutional committee,
Ambrosini and Felgate managed to extend the Twelve-Point Plan into a forty-seven page
'Green Paper'. Remarkably similar to the IFP's 1992 'Constitution of the State of
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KwaZulu-NataT, the Green Paper unequivocally asserted that the province be renamed
'The Kingdom of KwaZulu-NataT, and provided for extensive provincial powers which
would prevail over national ones. Indeed it cast the 'kingdom' as a 'federate province' of
the Republic and established dual citizenship of both KwaZulu-Natal and South Africa.
Further, it provided for a provincial judiciary and provincial control over the police, civil
service, local government, as well as a provincial militia. It also established Ulundi as the
capital ofKwaZulu-Natal (Green Paper: Constitutional Principles, adopted by tlieKZN
legislature on 3 October 1995). The ANC rejected this as 'a document... written under
the supposition of and in preparation for secession' (Weekly Mail & Guardian 15-9-95).
However, the IFP 's strategy at this time was not to win over the ANC, but the third largest
party in the province, and potentially the key to the other minority parties, the NP.
In September 1995 the IFP and NP MPPs held a bosberaad which saw significant
progress, indeed Smith describes it 'as the breakthrough needed to generate consensus'
(personal interview, 23-7-96). Further meetings between Buthelezi and de Klerk, and
Felgate and NP KwaZulu-Natal leader Danie Schutte, saw a proposal for a 'Council of
State' cemented. This was to consist of six MPPs, appointed by the provincial
parliament's three largest parties on the basis of two members for each party, provided
that a refusal of a party to participate in the Council would not prevent its functioning (a
move obviously designed to prevent the ANC from rendering the Council unworkable).
The Council would ratify decisions by the provincial cabinet regarding legislation
concerned with specified areas of competence, including provincial law and order,
security matters, the media, the provincial budget and any amendments to the
constitution (KZN Briefing, 1996 [1]). In effect, the Council would have significantly
disempowered the provincial cabinet, giving the NP an effective veto over key areas of
provincial decision-making. Certainly the ANC rejected the notion as 'inherently
impractical and undemocratic' and accused die NP of'a betrayal of trust and confidence'
(interview with Jeffries, 15-7-96). In fact, so concerned were die ANC at these initiatives
that national constitutional negotiator Pravin Gordhan was 'invited' to help manage die
ANC's response {Ibid).
From this point on in late 1995, events moved with increasing frenzy and complexity
as the pressure to finish the provincial constitution mounted. In this context, the EFP's
strategic dilemma became more pronounced. On the one hand it was concerned to secure
a constitution as federal as possible, on die other it required the support of other parties
who were lukewarm, even antagonistic, towards federalism. Tliis dilemma played itself
out around two axes, one within the EFP's control, and one outside of it In looking to
secure a federal constitution die EFP tended to err on the side of confrontation, often
beyond the point of tactical sense. Whilst partly due to the pressure to secure a
constitution sufficiently federal to prompt a constitutional crisis, it also reflected the
partiailar personalities driving this politics. The second variable was die resistance of
minority parties, especially the ANC. Essentially looking to filibuster rather than reach
agreement, die ANC pushed die IFP into a position where it had to gain the support of all
die remaining political parties - a near impossible task. Consequentiy die EFP
equivocated between trying to achieve tiiis, or alternatively, looking to agreement with
die ANC to an extent winch would at least bring die otiier parties onboard.
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A good illustration of this dilemma is revealed in the IFP's attempts in October and
November 1995 to get the Green Paper through the provincial legislature. Despite tlie
agreements reached with the NP, the IFP was finding the NP unwilling to commit itself.
Interviewed in November 1995 Ambrosini said 'fortlie last three weeks tilings have been
in place but the NP refuse to sign. I don't trust them. They are opportunistic and ignorant
idiots.' Tlie NP's equivocation was rooted in two sets of factors. First, in looking to
strengtlien its hand, die IFP used the provincial parliament to amend the composition of
tlie constitutional committee to reflect its dominance, in tlie process ignoring a
'gentleman's agreement' with tlie NP to postpone tlie matter until the majority of the NP
MPPs had returned from a caucus meeting in Johannesburg. An NP spokesperson
complained that his party had been 'stabbed in the back'. In addition, and more
importantly, tlie NP was coming under pressure from tlie ANC. According to John
Jeffries, provincial NP leaders were under pressure from de Klerk (and presumably from
tlie ANC nationally) to ensure that the provincial constitution-making process did not
exclude the ANC (KZN Briefing, 1996 [1]). Indeed, it was shortly after this, on Tuesday
23 January 1996, that tlie ANC secretly met tlie NP's Roelf Meyer in Cape Town and
promised 'greater facilitation' at national level if the NP backed the ANC provincially
(interviews with Smith, 23-7-96; Jeffries, 15-7-96). It seems then that if the IFP was
using the provincial constitution-making process to influence tlie national one, the ANC
was using the national one to influence the provincial.
The IFP's problems with tlie NP were soon generalised when tlie IFP tried to force a
vote on the Green Paper, a move which angered opposition parties who perceived this as
an attempt to bind tlie constitutional committee to tlie document's principles. Tlie ANC
insisted that the provincial constitution remain subordinate to the national one. It also
objected to the title of 'Kingdom', the proposed siting of tlie capital in Uhuidi, and tlie
notion of provincial citizenship. The DP criticised tlie IFP for undoing tlie progress
achieved in multi-party talks, and complained that tlie federalist cause was being imdone
by the 'bloody-minded attitude of tlie IFP' (The Natal Witness 16-11-95). In tlie event,
opposition parties refused to vote on the Green Paper, generally put up significant
resistance and eventually walked out of tlie parliamentary sitting. Confronted with this
setback, tlie IFP looked to adopting a different tack, initiating an intense series of
bilaterals with opposition parties, and began making significant concessions on the
proposals outlined in tlie Green Paper. Indeed, tlie release of tlie draft national
Constitution in December 1995 seemed to prompt tlie IFP towards compromise with
minority parties. Urgently requiring consensus to secure the provincial constitution, tlie
IFP agreed to scrap clauses calling for a separate provincial judiciary, militia and
constitutional court. Tlie siting of tlie capital city was removed as a constitutional issue,
while sunrise clauses were recognised as 'aspirations that have to be negotiated at
national level in the constitutional assembly to be validated' {FinancialMail 15-12-95).
However, justwhenit seemed that the moderate line had prevailed, tlie IFP underwent
a mood swing back to intransigence which,'*as before, failed. In short, a pattern was
beginning to emerge: caught between securing a sufficiently federal document and tlie
two-thirds support required, tlie IFP was repeatedly forced from asserting its preferences
in confrontational fashion, to compromise with minority parties. Hence, in early January
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1996 the IFP cancelled a meeting where minority parties were to present their proposals,
declaring that it 'had no mandate to negotiate further' {The Natal Witness 6-1-96). The
party insisted that it had done all it could to seek an all-inclusive settlement, and
Buthelezi warned that 'if the ANC sabotages the adoption of a provincial constitution in
KwaZulu-Natal, current problems between the ANC and IFP will pale in comparison to
the crisis that will develop' (Tfie Natal Witness 4-3-96). Tensions between the parties
remained high during this time, and relations in the provincial legislature were
characterised by 'constant bickering rather than getting on with the job of governing'
{WeeklyMail & Guardian 8-12-95). On 7 February 1996 the Official Draft Constitution
for KwaZulu-Natal was published in the Provincial Gazette. The issue of provincial
autonomy remained unresolved, as did the status of traditional leaders, the Council of
State, the provincial Constitutional Court and the Bill of Rights. The committee's
constitutional advisers also expressed many doubts over the constitutional legality of
many clauses, especially phrases declaring a federal relationship between die 'kingdom'
and the 'Republic'. Nevertheless, the constitutional committee remained committed to
11 March as the final deadline for the submission of the constitution to the legislature for
ratification.
In the event, resistance from minority parties forced the IFP back from confrontation
to accommodation as disgruntlement with the document and especially the conflictual
process around it became evident In late February 1996 the African Christian
Democratic Party (ACDP) withdrew from the constitutional committee in frustration
that its appeal for an anti-abortion clause in the official draft had not been included. This
left the IFP little alternative but to seek agreement with the larger parties. In short, riding
the horns of its strategic dilemma prompted the IFP to vacillate between wanting to
exclude the ANC to being forced to include it. Consequently, on 10 March a three-way
ANC/NP/EFP workshop took place, but failed to make any progress. The next day the IFP
was back in bilaterals with minority parties, notably the ACDP, now leaning towards
excluding the ANC from the process. However, the IFP had left tilings too late to
consolidate support. Hence, on Tuesday 12 March the Constitutional Committee put the
new constitution to vote, unable to postpone it any longer. The IFP, NP and ACDP voted
for it, the ANC and DP against, while the PAC and MF abstained. This deadlock
necessitated further discussion that collapsed on 13 March when the ANC withdrew
from the constitutional committee in objection to IFP demands that decisions be taken by
simple majority, complaining of 'off-hand' treatment by the Speaker and Premier (The
Natal Witness 14-3-96) (5).
With the ANC out of the process the IFP persisted on the course of compromise in the
hope of securing the required two-thirds majority (for example, the ACDP had agreed to
a referendum on the abortion issue). It was now, for instance, that the Council of State
proposal was finally jettisoned. Then, just when it looked as if the deal was imminent, for
reasons which remain opaque,' Amichand Rajbansi of the Minority Front put forward
ANC position after ANC position, frustrating the IFP at the final hurdle. Stalemate was
reached, forcing the IFP to return to negotiating with the ANC, and inaugurating the final
round of horse trading. In this process the IFP conceded the suspension of the status of
traditional leaders as the primary tier of local government, while the ANC in turn
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conceded the inclusion of various contentious clauses in tlie final document as sunrise
clauses,7 with the proviso that these could be challenged within the forum of the
Constitutional Court once the general framework had been agreed upon. By 15 March
1996 the IFP and ANC had reached agreement on a draft provincial constitution which,
according to John Jeffries, looked like it had 'been shot with an AK47' (personal
interview, 15-7-96).
The Final Round of Constitution-Making - The Constitutional Cou rt
On 19 March 1996 the final draft of die KwaZulu-Natal Constitution was sent to the
Constitutional Court for approval, having been ratified by the provincial legislature on
15 March. On 9 September 1996 the Constitutional Court announced its refusal to certify
this constitution on the grounds that it was 'not consistent with the interim constitution
and the constitutional principles' (The Natal Witness 10-9-96). Its major flaw was tlie
claim to give powers to the provincial legislature and executive above those allowed by
the interim consu'tutioa References to KwaZulu-Natal as 'a self-governing province',
seeking 'greater self-determination within a united federal framework', were found to
undermine the national emphasis on 'one sovereign, democratic state', based on national
unity and 'indivisibility'. The draft proclaimed the constitution 'tlie supreme law of the
province', asserted its 'exclusive legislative and executive powers and functions', and
stipulated that 'a law of tlie province shall prevail over legislation of the RSA
inconsistent therewith', in contravention of the supremacy of the national constituu'oa
The Court ruled that the constitution 'seemed to have been passed by the KwaZulu-Natal
legislature under the misunderstanding that it enjoys a relationship of co-supremacy with
the national legislature, and even the Constitutional Assembly' (Ibid). The provincial
constitution was thus rejected and referred back to tlie legislature for amendment. Tlie
KwaZulu-Natal constitutional committee has yet to meet to amend it.
In sum then, not only did tlie provincial constitution bear scant resemblance to tlie
IFP's initial hardline proposals, but the IFP's tactic proved to be based on a faulty
premise. Quite simply, the Constitutional Court did not see the legal status of the
document in the same light as tlie IFP did. Further, even had tlie Constitutional Court
concurred on this matter, the manner in which the IFP managed KwaZulu-Natal's
constitution-making process, plus the resistance of minority parties, effectively quashed
hopes of achieving a radical outcome. All tlie IFP really acliieved was to alienate itself
from potential allies and exacerbate internal divides. Indeed, we would suggest that tlie
demise of Ambrosini and Mzimela and tlie defection of Felgate were in no small way tlie
result of tlie failure of tlie provincial constitution-making process. In hindsight then, it
seems that had the IFP been willing to settle for less, it would probably have achieved
more.
While tlie IFP was embroiled in its provincial constitutional-making efforts the
national constitution was passed by the necessary two-thirds majority in parliament on 8
May 1996 and sent to tlie Constitutional Court for ratification. Although tlie IFP took
some comfort from the Constitutional Court ruling in September that powers allocated to
tlie province were 'substantially less than and inferior to' those set out in die interim
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constitution (Keesings, September 1996), by then the battle was already lost Thus,
although the CA had ninety days to rewrite tie national constitution, the IFP remained
divided and ambivalent about what its approach should be. This was because while the
hardliners in the party were in the ascendancy, their strategy had clearly failed. After
some public equivocation the IFP returned to the CA, but soon demanded an extension of
the negotiating deadline to the 11 October on the basis that 'the constitution was being
hurried through' (New Nation 27-9-96). Believing itself marginalised in the process, the
IFP withdrew from the CA a week after rejoining. The Financial Mail opined that the
IFP's move had achieved nothing other than 'to confirm its image as the petulant
delinquent of South African politics which kicks and screams when it cannot get its way.
Inkatha cannot seem to reconcile itself to its status as a minority party' (11-10-96). On 11
October the final amendments to the national constitution were approved by the
Constitutional Court, and President Mandela signed the document on 10 December
1996.
The IFP's failure to participate in the national constitution-making processes before
and after the KwaZulu-Natal fiasco raises a further question: would the successful
prosecution of the provincial strategy have generated the 'further politics' it so desired?
Given the response of the ANC to international mediation, and the legal priority the
national constitution enjoyed, it is far from clear that the ANC would have been required
to behave in the way the IFP wanted. It also leaves open the question of how successfully
the IFP would have managed such 'further politics' anyhow. Given its record it is not
clear that the ANC had much to fear. In retrospect it seems that had the EFP pursued the
more accommodatory tactical strain evident in Konigkramer's Fernhill Agreement, it
probably would have enjoyed greater success at both national and provincial levels.
Instead, it simply ended up marginalising itself from the national constitution-making
process, squandering an opportunity to advance the cause of federalism, exposing its
obstinate tendencies, and proving itself a slow learner in the fundamental requirements
of liberal-democratic politics.
The Wider Decline of Militant Zulu Nationalism in IFP
Politics
That the KwaZulu-Natal constitution-making process proved such a hard lesson in the
strategic requirements of liberal-democratic politics for the IFP is all the more
remarkable given the party's move away from militant Zulu nationalism in other
domains of politics. Thus, while there were moments when brinkmanship was
accompanied by a more general turn to confrontation and Zulu rhetoric, they remained
isolated and infrequent. Generally, the IFP prosecuted its negotiations tactics without the
link to the mass level militant Zulu nationalism that characterised the transition period.
Indeed, as Ambrosini put it, 'the struggle over the form of state has moved into the
institutional domain' (personal interview, 25-11-95). Further, the IFP was aware that this
would weaken their chances of success for, as Walter Felgate observed, 'constitutional
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demands need to be backed by power-factors' (personal interview, 4-2-97). In this light,
one would expect tlie party to have behaved a little more circumspectly during tlie
provincial negotiations process, demonstrating some awareness of tlie limitations and
opportunities that an institutionally-limited power struggle posed. Of course, even had
the IFP pursued Konigkramer's more accommodatory approach, there was no guarantee
of a better outcome. The reason for this is simply that the party did not enjoy the
dominance of the provincial legislature as it had the KwaZulu government. Indeed, the
more general shift away from militant Zulu nationalism outlined below can be related to
tlie way in winch the new institutions of post-apartheid politics have reconfigured tlie
IFP's power-base and constituencies.
By tlie KwaZulu-Natal local government elections of June 1996, the EFP had been
largely charmed and compelled into the new deal. It was charmed by its provincial
victory and its participation in the national government which gave it a stake in the
institutions of democratic governance. Conversely, it was compelled by tlie public
defection of the Zulu King, sharing provincial government with a large and vigilant
opposition, and by tlie slow resuscitation of law and order. These developments
undermined its previous assets of Zulu nationalist rhetoric, monopoly of key state
institutions (tlie KwaZulu government, police etc.), and tlie freedom to organise
militarily. They also broke tlie IFP's exclusive hold over the old KwaZulu constituencies
of the civil service and small business.8 Importantly, this shift away from militant Zulu
nationalism should not be overstated given the continued reliance of the EFP on
traditional leaders. Indeed, it seems that traditional authorities are virtually as central to
tlie IFP's new power-base as they were to its previous one. Thus tlie post-1994 period lias
been one characterised by ambiguity, indecision and internal conflict for the IFP as tlie
strategies of the past Iiave waned without being replaced by a coherent alternative. This
argument is traced through an outline of developments in tlie political domains of
institutional design, governance, mass mobilisation and party organisation.
Besides constitution-making, traditional authorities are tlie other aspect of politics
central to tlie institutional domain. Perhaps tlie most dramatic development here after
1994 was tlie public distancing of King Zwelithini from Buthelezi and the IFP. In early
September 1994 Zwelithini publicly repudiated Butlielezi's claims to being 'traditional
Prime Minister', reportedly saying to Mandela: 'You were a prisoner for 27 years. I was a
prisoner for 24' {Weekly Mail & Guardian 23-9-94). Zwelithini's move threatened to
puncture a hole in tlie IFP's ideological balloon and undermine Buthelezi's social
standing, and so a fierce battle for tlie loyalty of the traditional elite ensued. By late 1995,
after a somewliat petulant and bitter struggle which saw Butlielezi and Zwelitliini calling
rival gatherings, boycotting each others events, invading live television shows, and
attempting to mobilise provincial and national governments behind them, something of a
stalemate was reached. Butlielezi seemed to have grudgingly' accepted the reality of
Zwelithini's independence, while Zwelithini was well aware of his limited powers in the
traditionalist domaia Aligned to Buthelezi, the House of Traditional Leaders seemed an
influential institution at provincial level, and tlie tribal elite even more so at local level.
This uneasy standoff lias perpetuated itself from late 1995 through to tlie present, aside
from instances of violence against the royal family,* and against the backdrop of anti-
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monarchy protests in Swaziland
In respect of governance, political dispute has moved away from the institutionally-
related issues of the transition years towards more policy-related questions, thus
removing a spur to old strategies. The central reason for this lias been the burgeoning
realisation that effective provincial governance requires co-operation between the
political parties, especially the IFP and ANC. In part this reflects tie division of political
power between the ANC dominated national government and KwaZulu-Natal's cities,
and the IFP dominated provincial government. However, it also reflects the division of
power within the provincial legislature where the EFP's slim majority is a limit on
domineering ambitions. Further, the IFP's overwhelming control of rural areas, and the
ANC's monopoly of the urban domain (as reflected in die 1996 local government
election results), means that proviiice-wide implementation is greatly facilitated by party
consensus. Lastly, the fact that IFP and ANC MPPs have had to work together has also
ameliorated tensions. Consequently, many of the ostensibly divisive issues such as
provincial powers and the location of the capital of KwaZulu-Natal have been contained
after initial disputes (interview with Erskine, 8-1-97), whereas issues of common cause
like economic growth and delivery, or unforeseen issues like crime, have proved more
troublesome.
This shift away from the issues of conflict of the transition lias been paralleled by a
slow, but steady, drop in mass confrontation and political violence. The period following
the national elections of 1994 saw significant political contests between the ANC and
IFP including the dispute over international mediation, the contest over the constitution-
making process and the run-up to the local government elections. Critically, while there
were significant instances of violence, notably the Shobashabane massacre of 25
December 1995 and various flare-ups in the run-up to the 1996 local government
elections, these tended to remain isolated incidents rather than spark sustained violence
linked to political contests. Not surprisingly therefore, general levels of violence have
dropped gradually but steadily since 1994 (HRC, 1997). Indeed it seems that political
conflict increasingly became institutionalised with politicians handling their disputes in
the corridors of power ratherthan on township streets orniral hillsides.
There are two sets of reasons for this trend. First, for reasons outlined above, was the
lessening of political competition. Second was the gradual return of law and order which
included both a series of special interventions and a more general transformation of the
security forces. The former included the Investigative Task Unit setup to investigate hit
squads, high profile national trials, the establishment of Special Task Units to investigate
particular incidents, and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. These initiatives
exposed the South African Military Intelligence-Special B ranch-EFP triumvirate at work
during the 1980s and even into the 1990s (Taylor and Shaw, 1998). In doing so they
removed an important source of military patronage for the IFP and embarrassed it
politically, thus making the prosecution of similar tactics more difficult, even counter-
productive. The latter refers to the slow transformation of the security forces into
institutions which serve and protect rather than repress, not least as the state is no longer
able to suspend the rule of law when it suits its interests to do so.
In sum then, the IFP lias largely endorsed and acquiesced to a post-apartheid state
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constructed against its express wishes. However, this has not been an easy adjustment,
indeed it has plunged the party into an identity crisis. This is reflected in the strategic
vacillation noted already, but also in the mood swings that have accompanied this, as well
as the numerous divisions which have become public knowledge. These developments,
we have argued, are rooted in the IFP 's changing political fortunes which, in turn, can be
related to the way in which the institutions of liberal-democracy have reconfigured the
party's power-base. This ambiguity is reinforced by the shifts in the actual and potential
constituencies of the IFP since 1994. As already noted, the IFP can no longer rely on its
traditional KwaZulu constituencies in quite the same way, for while it has been able to
retain the support of most traditional authorities, and therefore its association with the
rural constituency, it lias lost its monopoly on the loyalties of old KwaZulu civil servants
and small businessmen. At the same time, the demands of electioneering and policy-
making have pushed it to reach out for comparatively new constituencies of
conservative-liberal white and Indian people.
These developments were reflected in the IFP's various attempts at reorganising itself
since 1994, attempts which have generally failed as the party remained ambiguously
poised between old styles of operating as a patronage party, and attempts to move to a
conventional liberal-democratic alternative. At the July 1994 Conference the IFP
adopted a new constitution which devolved powers to provincial, regional and branch
levels. An attempt to develop into a more democratic organisation, this project was the
baby of new leadership, notably Secretary-General Ziba Jiyane, and was based on
business techniques borrowed, a little oddly, from Scientology {Weekly Mail & Guardian
13-1-95)! Although the 1994 constitution resembled the 1990 version quite closely, the
IFP pointed out that die latter was 'suspended' because of the 'war situation' in the early
1990s which forced Buthelezi 'to take virtually total control' {WeeklyMail & Guardian
22-7-94). However, while the new constitution opened space for an energetic and
visionary leader to exploit, and it looked like Ziba Jiyane might be that leader, this did not
come to pass. Fora range of reasons, including the lack of a coherent strategic orientation
by party leadership, the inlierent centralism of Buthelezi's leadership and Jiyane's own
weaknesses, he failed to seize the opportunity. Indeed, as a political party the IFP
remained in an organisational shambles (interview with Grinker, 22-1-97).
It was not long before these tensions manifested themselves in various public spats.
The strategic and geographical divisions over the constitution-making process have
already been noted. Another line of conflict was the ideological split between Zulu
'traditionalists' and 'modernists' in regard to the status of traditional leaders in local
government. These cleavages were exacerbated by personality conflicts and racial
tensions (interviews with Smith, 23-7-96; Mars, 21-1-97). Thus in June 1995 Buthelezi
went on a tirade against the 'coterie of whites' in his party saying, 'It is unfortunate that
we have attracted to the IFP... this type of white racist with twisted minds. They have
convinced themselves that there is nothing we as blacks can do on our own... such is the
political megalomania of these nuts' {Weekly Mail & Guardian 9-6-95). These
comments were aimed at the newer recruits like Mike Tarr who load been exploiting the
comparative freedom they enjoyed in the province. Such actions angered the Zulu 'old
guard' more used to Buthelezi's rule {Weekly Mail & Guardian 2-6-95). Shortly after this
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incident IFP whips at national level corralled Indian IFP MPs and berated them for
'laziness', a move which prompted IFP Senator Farouk Cassim to publicly accuse the
IFP of racism {Weekly Mail & Guardian 7-7-95).
The results of the June 1996 local government elections prompteda 'prolonged period
of self-criticism and internal wrangling for the IFP', reopening divides between
'traditionalists' and 'modernists'. National Council meetings were described as being
'frequently dominated by back stabbing confrontations which had spawned a series of
divisions along racial, ideological and geographical lines.' Younger party members
criticised Buthelezi's autocratic leadership style and called for the democratisation of
party structures. Yet repeated efforts at this have amounted to nauglit, not least because of
Buthelezi's strong patronage relations with traditionalists. Indeed, in January 1997,
tensions reached a head with Buthelezi berating certain members as 'indolents who
expect political success to fall into their laps', and accusing them of creating party
divisions. The parry's general conference at the end of January witnessed an
unprecedented purge of moderates -KwaZulu-NatalPrcmierFrankMdlalose, Secretary-
General Ziba Jiyane and Gauteng legislature leader Musa Myeni all resigned their posts,
allegedly underpressure from hardliners.
This organisational unhappiness was not limited to the more moderate elements
however, as by late 1997 key hardliners in the party, notably those who had driven the
provincial constitution-making process, began to feel the pinch. Mario Ambrosini lias all
but disappeared from parry processes, Sipho Mzimela was threatened with expulsion
from the IFP for publicly advocating a merger with the ANC, and Walter Felgate left the
IFP for the ANC, complaining of Buthelezi's hea\y-handed and uncompromising
attitude. Whilst the reasons for these developments are complex, they are related to a
general malaise in the IFP which has much to do with its inability to fully transform
organisationally and culturally into a conventional liberal-democratic party. Important
here is Butlielezi's personal style which, according to one member of the National
Council, means that 'only praise singers of the leader are likely to remain in office ...
questioning of authority or even debate is completely unacceptable ... there is no such
thing as democracy within the party... That is why there is no secondary leadership layer
or even remote indication as to who would replace Buthelezi if he suddenly disappeared.'
Conclusion
Tliat the IFP's politics lias shifted significantly over the last four years is beyond doubt.
Gone are the frequent and overt invocations of Zuluness, and gone too are the
confrontational tactics and threats of violence. In their place is a more ambiguous and
vague affirmation of conservative and liberal values and a more accommodatory style.
Importantly though, we get the sense of a party in hiatus, uncertain of precisely which
mast to nail its colours to. The reasons for this, we have argued, are not incidental, but
related to the manner in which the new institutions and culture of liberal-democracy have
reconfigured the power-bases and constituencies of the parry. Simply put, under these
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new conditions, the old militant Zulu nationalist strategy is redundant, even counter-
productive.
As our examination of the KwaZulu-Natal provincial constitution-making process
lias shown, this reality has slowly but inexorably forced itself on the IFP. Thus even at a
time when mihtant Zulu nationalism was on the wane in other areas of politics, so
breaking the link between brinkmanship and mass level mihtant Zulu nationalism which
typified the transition years, the IFP repeatedly pursued confrontational tactics only to be
forced to turn to accommodation. In this instance the lessons of liberal-democracy were
learned the hard way. The focus on the constitution-making process brings out a further
contrast between the core dynamics of the transition and burgeoning features of post-
apartheid politics. Where the former was dominated by the often violent struggle
between political parties, the latter is moulded around routinised institutional processes.
In sum then, political parties in general have to adapt to the reality that future politics will
be conducted more in the corridors of power than on the streets of townships or rural
hillsides.
Finally, one outcome of this transformation of politics means that the IFP finds itself
in a scenario where, having failed in its bid to turn the provincial constitution-making
process into the final stand against the ANC victory during the negotiations process, it is
no longer clear what distinguishes it from the ANC. In respect of objectives, the key
difference is the IFP's firmer commitment to provincial autonomy which, in part anyway,
is rooted in the contingency of using the KwaZulu Bantustan as a 'Trojan horse' to fight
the system from within. Given that the party had always regarded the national stage as its
primary ambition, aplace within the ANC could be one means of securing this. In respect
of political standing, the comparative status of the two parties is largely settled.
Considering the common origins of the two, and the similar constituencies, some form of
merger is now a real possibility. It is not inconceivable then, that the demise of the
KwaZulu-Natal constitution could also mark the demise of the IFP.
Notes
All interviews referred to in this article were undertaken by Laurence Piper, namely:
Ambrosini, M. IFP Constitutional Adviser (25-11-95); Carrim, Y. SACP National
Executive Committee member, ANCMP (11-8-96); Erskine, H. Head of Administration,
KwaZulu-Natal National Council of Provinces (NCOP) (8-1-97); Felgate, W. IFP MP
and negotiator (4-2-97); Grinker, A. IFP Deputy Campaign Manager, Local
Government Elections (22-1-97); Jeffries, J. ANC AIPP and constitutional negotiator
(15-7-96); Konigkramer, A. IFP MPP, Managing Editor o/Ilanga newspaper (8-7-94
and 22-1-97); Lubisi, C. Former ANC andS.4CP office bearer (13-4-96,15-7-94 and 4-
9-96); Mars, I. IFP MP (21-1-97); Nzimande, B. ANC and S4CP NEC member. Chair of
Education Portfolio Committee, National Assembly (18-7-96 and 24-7-96); and Smith, P.
IFP constitutional adviser (23-7-96).
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1. The transition is used here in conventional terms to mean the negotiations
between 2 February 1990 and 26 April 1994.
2. A long-standing and defining feature of Inkatha's politics lias been its advocacy
of a range of quasi-federal constitutional arrangements for a post-apartheid
South Africa. These include Buthelezi's suggestion of a 'black federation' of
homelands in 1973, the consociational proposals of the Buthelezi Commission
of 1980 and the Indaba of 1986, as well as the Joint Executive Authority for
KwaZulu and Natal of 1987 (Horrell, 1973:20; Buthelezi Commission,
1981:111-4; Langer, 1983:14; Forsyth, 1994:79-80). During the transition the
IFP released the strongly federal 'Draft Constitution for the State of
KwaZulu/NataT in December 1991, a final form of which was released ayear
later as the 'Federal Constitution for the State of KwaZulu-NataT (see De Haas
andZulu, 1993).
3. This was particularly evident in the IFP's frustration at the deadlock-breaking
mechanism of "sufficient consensus' used during negotiations. Supposedly a
device to be employed when full consensus was being blocked by the
opposition of minor parties, it came to mean agreement between the NP and
ANC. Thus, 'sufficient consensus' saw ANC/NP agreement become the
sufficient condition for a negotiated settlement (Friedman, 1993:24).
Consequently, a central demand of the IFP was for negotiations processes in
which it enjoyed the same status as the ANC and NP. Hence, the key concession
given by the ANC on 19 April 1994, the agreement which facilitated the IFP's
participation in the national elections, was international mediation (Buthelezi,
1994; also see Cassidy, 1995:145-190; and The Sunday Tribune 24-4-94. This
was precisely the kind of inclusive process that the IFP was looking for.
4. At this point it is worth noting that the right to draft provincial constitutions was
a concession wrung from the ANC by the IFP in the build-up to the 1994
election (Atkinson, 1994:37). Hence, Chapter 160 of the Interim Constitution
empowered provincial legislatures to adopt a provisional constitution with the
support of two-thirds of its members - so long as the provincial constitution was
not 'inconsistent with - (a) a provision of this Constitution, including this
Chapterand the Constitutional principles set out in Schedule 4...'.
5. Walter Felgate defected to the ANC in late 1997. He was interviewed while still
an IFP member, on 4-2-97.
6. Somewhat ironically, the ANC was objecting to a deadlock-breaking
mechanism not dissimilar to the tactic of 'sufficient consensus' which it had
employed during national constitutional negotiations, and which had similarly
annoyed and marginalised the IFP.
7. Speculation of a deal between Rajbansi and the ANC was rife. Some suggested
that the ANC would not contest Rajbansi's strongholds in Chatsworth, Durban,
in the upcoming local government elections (KZN Briefing 1996 [1]; interview
with Smith, 23-7-96).
8. Wevvishto tliankJohnWrightforbringingtliispoiiitto ourattention.
9. In December 1995 one of Zwelithini's brothers, Prince Mbousi Zulu, was
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killed, and in March 1996 the residence of one of Zvvelitliini's wives, Queen
Buhle, was attacked. The Queen was injured and one of her daughters, Princess
Sibusile, killed (Weekly Mail & Guardian 1-5-96). Although the attackers
remain at large there is no doubt that Zwelithini holds the IFP responsible for
both incidents.
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